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Unconventional Methods for a Traditional Setting: The Use
of Virtual Reality to Reduce Implicit Racial Bias in the
Courtroom
NATALIE SALMANOWITZ *
ABSTRACT
The presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial lie at the core
of the United States justice system. While existing rules and practices serve
to uphold these principles, the administration of justice is significantly
compromised by a covert but influential factor: namely, implicit racial
biases. These biases can lead to automatic associations between race and
guilt, as well as impact the way in which judges and jurors interpret
information throughout a trial. Despite the well-documented presence of
implicit racial biases, few steps have been taken to ameliorate the problem in
the courtroom setting. This Article discusses the potential of virtual reality
to reduce these biases among judges and jurors. Through analyzing the
various ethical and legal considerations, this Article contends that
implementing virtual reality training with judges and jurors would be
justifiable and advisable should effective means become available. Given
that implicit racial biases can seriously undermine the fairness of the justice
system, this Article ultimately asserts that unconventional debiasing methods
warrant legitimate attention and consideration.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2011, the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences published
a study 1 that immediately made international headlines. An analysis of
parole decisions among eight judges in Israel revealed a surprising factor that
influenced these cases’ outcomes. While one might have expected this factor
to involve the gravity of the crime committed or the length of time served, it
turned out to be something completely unrelated to the defendant or the
crime: namely, the degree to which the judge was hungry or tired. 2
Decisions to grant parole were highly correlated with a judge’s break
schedule—judges were more likely to deny parole requests heard right before
Shai Danziger et al., Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 PROC.
NAT’L
ACAD.
SCI.
U.S.
6889
(2011),
http://www.pnas.org/content/108/17/6889.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/RCR9-QVVT].
2
Id. at 6890. Some scholars debate the conclusions and explanatory power of
this article. See Keren Weinshall-Margel & John Shapard, Overlooked Factors in
the Analysis of Parole Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. E833 (2011),
http://www.pnas.org/content/108/42/E833.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MZL-DB59].
However, for Danziger and colleagues’ rebuttal, see Shai Danziger et al., Reply to
Weinshall-Margel and Shapard: Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions Persist,
NAT’L
ACAD.
SCI.
U.S.
E834
(2011),
108
PROC.
http://www.pnas.org/content/108/42/E834.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/6393-FTC9].
1
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a break, whereas requests heard soon after a break were more likely to be
granted. 3 The results of this study prompted significant uproar, as evidenced
by headlines such as “When Lunch is Served, So is Justice” 4 and “Hungry
Judges Dispense Rough Justice.” 5 The fact that a justice system could
involve such patently extralegal factors seemed to threaten the court’s
legitimacy and spark doubts as to whether justice was actually being
delivered.
While this study is certainly interesting, its results are not nearly as
groundbreaking or shocking as the media’s response might suggest. The
impact of extralegal factors in the courtroom is a well-documented
phenomenon that can influence both judges and jurors. 6 In fact, whereas
hunger and fatigue are sensations of which individuals are consciously
aware, opinions and decisions can also be affected by factors unbeknownst to
judges or jurors themselves. For example, individuals’ attractiveness,
demeanor, and clothing can all play a role in our perceptions of their
credibility and innocence. 7 Moreover, implicit reactions, such as racial
biases, are not only widespread, but also can shape the evaluation and
interpretation of information presented during a trial. 8 Implicit racial biases
are perhaps even more unsettling than factors such as attractiveness—while
assessments of the latter can vary from one person to the next, and
potentially balance out across judges and jurors, the majority of people have
implicit racial biases that trend in a specific direction. 9 The problem of
extralegal factors in the courtroom therefore extends much deeper and wider
Danziger et al., supra note 1, at 6890.
Meredith Melnick, When Lunch Is Served, So Is Justice, TIME (Apr. 14, 2011),
http://healthland.time.com/2011/04/14/when-lunch-is-served-so-is-justice
[https://perma.cc/HQE4-2VUA].
5
Zoë Corbyn, Hungry Judges Dispense Rough Justice, NATURE NEWS (Apr.
11,
2011),
http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110411/full/news.2011.227.html
[https://perma.cc/F6TU-3K3Q].
6
EDIE GREENE & KIRK HEILBRUN, WRIGHTSMAN’S PSYCHOLOGY AND THE
LEGAL SYSTEM 298–303 (Wadsworth, 7th ed. 2011).
7
Ray Bull, Physical Appearance and Criminality, 2 CURRENT PSYCHOL.
REVIEWS 269, 274–75 (1982); Louise Ellison & Vanessa E. Munro, Reacting to
Rape: Exploring Mock Jurors’ Assessments of Complainant Credibility, 49 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 202, 202-04, 210–13 (2009); see ADAM BENFORADO, UNFAIR: THE
NEW SCIENCE OF CRIMINAL INJUSTICE 3–25 (2015).
8
Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124,
1126–68 (2012); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect
Trial Judges? 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1221–26 (2009).
9
Mahzarin R. Banaji et al., How (Un)ethical Are You? HARV. BUS. REV., Dec.
2003, at 56, 58–60; Chris Mooney, Across America, Whites Are Biased and They
POST
(Dec.
8,
2014),
Don’t
Even
Know
It,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/12/08/across-america-whitesare-biased-and-they-dont-even-know-it/ [https://perma.cc/BP6W-MGNK].
3
4
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than hungry or tired judges.
Given the amount of existing literature on extralegal factors and implicit
racial biases, what should warrant consternation is not the mere presence of
such factors in the courtroom, but the relative lack of steps taken to mitigate
them. While some countermeasures have been suggested, 10 none appear to
be sufficiently promising solutions. This Article aims to propose and
examine an unconventional method to reduce implicit racial biases in the
courtroom, specifically the use of virtual reality. Although the actual
materialization of such a prospect is still distant, researchers are beginning to
discover various techniques that have the potential to ameliorate the impact
of these biases.
Should such research come to fruition, this Article suggests that virtual
reality training to reduce implicit racial biases in judges and jurors would be
a justifiable and desirable endeavor. Part I provides a summary of the
literature on implicit racial bias, with special attention to studies in the
courtroom setting. Part II offers an overview and critique of commonly
suggested countermeasures, while Part III proposes virtual reality as an
alternative strategy. Part IV argues the case for virtual reality training with
judges, addressing potential objections that might ensue. Lastly, Part V
applies this framework to the jury context, articulating the main divergences
from the case of judges.
Since virtual reality paradigms have not been explicitly designed for use
in the courtroom setting, this Article should be read primarily as a thought
experiment. The main purpose of this Article is to demonstrate the
advantage of incorporating virtual reality into the courtroom, not to delineate
plans for its actual implementation. Through advocating for further research
on virtual reality paradigms, and proposing potential policies for introducing
the technology to the courts, this Article seeks, at the very least, to guide
future discussion on novel and unconventional methods to reduce implicit
racial bias in the courtroom.

Kang et al., supra note 8, at 1169–86; Dale K. Larson, A Fair and Implicitly
Impartial Jury: An Argument for Administering the Implicit Association Test during
Voir Dire, 3 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 139, 158–69 (2010); Rachlinski et al., supra
note 8, at 1226–31; Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection
of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827, 857–75 (2012); Samuel R. Sommers &
Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation of Prejudice against Black
Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 201, 221–23
(2001).
10
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I. DEFINING THE PROBLEM: A PRIMER ON IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS IN THE
COURTROOM
A. Fairness, Impartiality, and the Nature of Bias
The notion of a “fair and impartial trial” is one of the most championed
aspects of the justice system. 11 Yet, despite this concept’s widespread
acclaim, and its appearance throughout multiple legal standards,12 an official
explanation of the phrase is absent from legal doctrine. Although fairness is
often associated with due process, equal treatment under the law, and the
assurance that each defendant receives the protections he is guaranteed, 13 it is
unclear how and to what extent fairness relates to impartiality. Namely, how
impartial must a trial be in order to meet expectations of fairness, and at what
point does the presence of partiality violate such standards? While this
Article does not purport to definitively answer this question, it is necessary to
define a baseline understanding of impartiality in order to frame the
discussion of bias in the courtroom.
One way to analyze standards of impartiality is to reference existing
doctrine to see what is, and is not, considered an acceptable level of bias. In
the case of judges, simply conjecturing possible sources of bias is generally
insufficient grounds for disqualification; instead, there needs to be a
reasonable expectation that certain factors would interfere with a judge’s
ability to “be impartial,” whether the bias constitutes an actual conflict of
interest, or creates a legitimate appearance of partiality. 14 For jurors,
standards of impartiality are somewhat lower. 15 During voir dire, individuals
ANDREW G. FERGUSON, WHY JURY DUTY MATTERS: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO
CONSTITUTIONAL ACTION 4–6 (NYU Press, 2013) (discussing the importance of the
Sixth Amendment and the role of jury trials).
12
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; 28 U.S.C. § 144 (2014); 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2014).
13
See, e.g., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG., THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. DOC. NO.1129, 112th Cong., 2d Sess.1611-16 (2014), www.gpo.gov/constitutionannotated
[https://perma.cc/RW4C-62B4] (discussing fairness, due process, and constitutional
protections as they apply to juries and the Sixth Amendment).
14
See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (indicating when parties suspect judicial bias, they can
file an affidavit that “shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or
prejudice exists . . .”); 28 U.S.C. § 455 (“Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of
the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned . . . He shall also disqualify himself . . . [w]here he
has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding”); CHARLES G. GEYH, FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION 17–22 (2d ed. 2010) (analyzing the
details and interpretations of 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455).
15
See Scott W. Howe, Juror Neutrality or an Impartiality Array: A Structural
Theory of the Impartial Jury Mandate, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1173, 1183–86
11
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expressing potential bias may still be selected for jury service if they assert
that their biases can be put aside to “impartially” hear the case. 16 At the
same time, however, pretrial publicity can lead to a change in trial venue, on
the basis that exposing jurors to prejudicial information before the trial might
impede their ability to (a) hear the case with an open mind and (b) adhere to
the presumption of innocence; explicit conflicts of interest can disqualify
jurors for the same reasons. 17 Taken together, these facts suggest that
impartiality does not necessarily entail complete neutrality or a lack of
preexisting opinions on issues relevant to the trial; nevertheless, the law does
seem to draw a line when preconceptions would foreseeably influence the
decision-making process. This Article therefore defines impartiality as the
absence of preconceived notions that would reasonably impact a judge or
juror’s assessment of information presented throughout the case in a manner
that favored or disfavored a defendant.
The remainder of Part I argues that implicit racial biases render judges
and jurors incapable of meeting this basic conceptualization of impartiality.
Not only can these biases alter the way in which individuals interpret
information, but they also tend to disproportionately disadvantage members
of one race. The following section explains how general biases persist in the
courtroom in the first place, and why implicit racial biases in particular pose
such a threat to the fairness and impartiality of trials.
The justice system possesses mechanisms to screen for clear instances of
bias in judges and jurors. In the case of judges, parties may request that the
judge recuse herself if there is reason to suspect partiality. 18 With jurors, the
voir dire process enables attorneys and judges to ask probing questions of
potential jurors to uncover signs of bias. 19 Despite these protocols, partiality
still plays a large role in the courtroom for three main reasons: (1) the bias
blindspot, (2) the social desirability effect, and (3) the existence of implicit
biases. According to the concept of bias blindspots, while people are aware
that biases occur in the general population, they tend to overestimate their
own degree of impartiality. 20 Next, the social desirability effect highlights
individuals’ perceived need for others to view them in a socially respectable
light, which often prevents people from disclosing biases that are regarded as
taboo. 21 Lastly, motions for recusal and the voir dire process primarily target
explicit biases, which are attitudes or prejudices that individuals consciously
(1995) (explaining how the standard of impartiality for jurors is ambiguous, and that
in many cases jurors can still serve despite expressing some degree of bias).
16
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 13, at 1619–20; NEIL VIDMAR &
VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 90–93 (2007).
17
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 13, at 1620–21.
18
28 U.S.C. § 144.
19
FED. R. CRIM. P. 24.
20
Kang et al., supra note 8, at 1173–74.
21
VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 16, at 92–93.
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possess. 22 As a result, the justice system leaves untouched many implicit
biases that judges and jurors are not aware of having, but that are believed to
account for a disturbingly high percentage of behavior. 23
Implicit biases, which often diverge from one’s explicitly held beliefs, 24
are an inevitable byproduct of having efficient cognitive systems. 25 In order
to quickly make sense of all the stimuli bombarding them, people make
generalizations about various individuals, social groups, and situations in a
way that enables prediction of subsequent interactions and outcomes. 26
While the ability to make generalizations is frequently harmless and even
quite useful in terms of efficiency, such judgments can also lead to negative
assessments of individuals, as well as stereotypical associations between
specific attributes and identity groups. 27 The automatic and influential nature
of these biases can be appreciated by neuroscientific research involving
implicitly prejudiced or stereotyped evaluations. For example, studies have
explored activation in brain regions such as the amygdala, the anterior insula,
and the anterior temporal lobe, which are implicated in threat processing,
disgust reactions, and social stereotyping, respectively. 28 Researchers have
observed increased activation in these three areas when white participants
view black faces, and this heightened reactivity positively correlates with the
degree of implicit racial bias. 29 Accordingly, the fact that initial reactions of
threat and disgust can arise when simply viewing a member of a racial
outgroup presents serious problems in the trial context, where judges and
jurors are expected to enter the courtroom with an open mind.
B. Measuring Implicit Racial Bias
Before delving into studies examining implicit racial bias in the
courtroom, it is helpful to first explain how researchers identify the presence
and magnitude of these biases, as well as describe the patterns that typically
emerge. The most commonly used method is the Implicit Association Test
(IAT), which measures reaction times during a sorting task. 30 The race
Larson, supra note 10, at 141; Casey Reynolds, Implicit Bias and the Problem
of Certainty in the Criminal Standard of Proof, 37 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 229, 230–
31 (2013); Roberts, supra note 10, at 835–42.
23
Rachlinski et al., supra note 8, at 1201–02.
24
Banaji et al., supra note 9, at 56–58.
25
JAMIE WARD, THE STUDENT’S GUIDE TO SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE 213–15
(2012).
26
David M. Amodio, The Neuroscience of Prejudice and Stereotyping, 15
NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 670, 670 (2014).
27
WARD, supra note 25, at 213.
28
Amodio, supra note 26, at 671, 673, 676.
29
Id. at 671–73, 676.
30
See Brian A. Nosek et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association
22
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version of the IAT shows participants two sets of paired terms, with one set
on the upper left corner of a computer screen and the other on the upper right
corner. 31 A participant will either see a “stereotype-congruent” arrangement
of Black/Bad in one corner and White/Good in the other, or a “stereotypeincongruent” arrangement with pairings of Black/Good and White/Bad. 32
When presented with black and white faces, as well as positive and negative
words, participants must match the particular stimulus with its appropriate
label in one of the corners of the screen. 33 After a participant completes trials
with both stereotype-congruent and incongruent pairings, the average
reaction times for the two trials are compared. 34 A faster response for
stereotype-congruent pairings suggests a preference for white faces, which
can be further categorized according to a slight, moderate, or strong degree. 35
The IAT can be used for many stereotype-based associations other than race
(such as gender, age, etc.), and has been taken by over 4.5 million people. 36
Interestingly, not only do 75% of all participants show a preference towards
white faces, 37 but non-white participants tend to also exhibit a preference for
white faces (while simultaneously displaying a greater preference than
average for members of their own race). 38 Additionally, researchers have
modified the Race IAT to test the association between race and guilt. 39 This
version of the test has been coined the Guilt IAT, and has shown that
individuals commonly associate black men with terminology related to
criminal culpability. 40 These results might be especially concerning in light
of confirmation biases, which hold that people are more likely to interpret
evidence in a way that aligns with their presuppositions. 41
Apart from the IAT, two other tests are frequently used to measure
Test: II. Method Variables and Construct Validity, 31 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 166,
179 (2005) (addressing common criticisms of the IAT and providing evidence for
IMPLICIT,
construct
validity);
About
the
IAT,
PROJECT
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/iatdetails.html [https://perma.cc/M7Z7-5V2V]
(last visited Feb. 8, 2016) (explaining the basic attributes of the IAT).
31
About the IAT, supra note 30.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
PROJECT
IMPLICIT,
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/faqs.html [https://perma.cc/3RU3-RCPA] (last
visited Feb. 8, 2016).
36
Brandon Keim, Researchers Try to Cure Racism, WIRED (Jan. 20, 2009, 5:25
PM), http://www.wired.com/2009/01/racetraining/ [https://perma.cc/W6AQ-CMSP].
37
Banaji et al., supra note 9, at 3.
38
Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 35.
39
Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty
Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 189–90 (2010).
40
Id.
41
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 80–81 (2011).

2016

UNCONVENTIONAL METHODS

125

implicit racial bias in criminal contexts: the Weapons Identification Task and
the Shoot No-Shoot Test. The Weapons Identification Task, also a measure
of response time, displays a picture of either a gun or a tool on the computer
screen and asks participants to identify the object presented.42 Prior to seeing
the object, a white or black face is quickly flashed on the screen. 43 Studies
using this measure have revealed three particularly important findings. First,
when white participants have to make these judgments in a constricted time
frame, they are more likely to incorrectly identify a tool as a weapon when
primed with a black face. 44 Second, when given unlimited time to complete
the task, participants are more accurate in their judgments, but correctly
identify a weapon faster after seeing a black face. 45 Lastly, this pattern of
results persists even when participants are explicitly told to disregard the
faces and to not let them skew subsequent judgments. 46
A similar paradigm, the Shoot No-Shoot Test, involves a videogame in
which white and black men appear on the screen, and either have a weapon
or a neutral object in hand. 47 Designed to mimic a situation often
experienced by police officers, participants are told to shoot those holding a
weapon while their response times and accuracy levels are measured. 48 A
study involving black and white participants found that both groups were
faster to shoot armed men when the target was black 49 (and were also faster
in deciding not to shoot an unarmed man when the target was white). 50
Importantly, this study also measured participants’ knowledge and subjective
evaluations of cultural stereotypes associating black men with violent
crime. 51 While the degree to which participants agreed with this stereotype
was unrelated to their performance on the task, knowledge of the stereotype
was positively correlated with incorrect shooting responses. 52 Thus, simply

42
B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The Role of Automatic and
Controlled Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 181,
184 (2001).
43
Id.
44
Id. at 189.
45
Id. at 185–87, 190; B. Keith Payne, Weapon Bias: Split-Second Decisions and
Unintended Stereotyping, 15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 287, 287 (2006).
46
B. Keith Payne et al., Best Laid Plans: Effects of Goals on Accessibility Bias
and Cognitive Control in Race-Based Misperceptions of Weapons, 38 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 384, 388–95 (2002).
47
Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to
Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314,
1317–26 (2002).
48
Id. at 1315–17.
49
Id. at 1324.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 1321.
52
Id. at 1322–23.
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being aware of the stereotype influenced decisions, regardless of one’s
explicit attitudes.
C. Implicit Racial Bias in the Courtroom
Although the IAT, the Weapon Identification Task, and the Shoot-No
Shoot Test are often used to examine implicit racial bias in the general
population, a few studies have applied these measures specifically to the
courtroom setting. 53
Given the difficulties of conducting real-time
experiments during trials, most studies addressing judges and jurors involve
evaluations of hypothetical scenarios or post-hoc analyses of trial outcomes.
Nevertheless, these studies reveal that implicit racial biases in judges and
jurors are likely to have potent impacts on criminal justice proceedings. 54
To start, research has illuminated the effect of a defendant’s race on
judicial behavior in both hypothetical situations and actual sentencing
patterns. 55 In a study exploring implicit racial bias in judges, Jeffrey
Rachlinski and colleagues 56 administered the Race IAT to judges of varying
races, genders, and jurisdictions. Overall, the white judges demonstrated a
strong preference for white faces while the black judges did not display an
overarching trend one way or the other. 57 The researchers then provided
these judges with a hypothetical scenario in which either the defendant was
black and the victim was white, or vice versa. 58 Interestingly, the authors
observed significant correlations between IAT scores and conviction
decisions only among the black judges. 59 When the defendant was white,
black judges with an IAT preference for black faces were more likely to
convict than were those with a white preference.60 This pattern flipped when
the defendant was black, meaning that black judges with a preference for
53
See Irene V. Blair et al., The Influence of Afrocentric Facial Features in
Criminal Sentencing, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 674, 676–78 (2004); Levinson et al., supra
note 39, at 201–08; Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias:
Skin Tone, Implicit Racial Bias, and Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W. VA.
L. REV. 307, 331–39 (2010); Rachlinski et al., supra note 8, at 1204–11; Sommers &
Ellsworth, supra note 10, at 216–21.
54
Blair et al., supra note 53, at 678; Kang et al., supra note 8, at 1142–52;
Larson, supra note 10, at 154–58; Levinson et al., supra note 39, at 207; Levinson &
Young, supra note 53, at 344–45; Rachlinski et al., supra note 8, at 1225–26;
Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 10, at 220–21.
55
See Blair et al., supra note 53, at 675–78; Rachlinski et al., supra note 8, at
1204–11.
56
Rachlinski et al., supra note 8, at 1204–11.
57
Id. at 1210.
58
Id. at 1211–12.
59
Id. at 1218–21.
60
Id. at 1220–21.
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black faces were now less likely to convict. 61 The researchers suggest that
the lack of correlation between IAT scores and conviction decisions in white
judges might stem from the fact that the majority of the judges were
cognizant of the experiment’s purpose. 62 Social desirability effects might
therefore explain the behavior of the white judges, who might have
anticipated that the researchers were expecting them to respond in a certain
way. 63 Nonetheless, this study reveals that implicit racial biases are not only
prevalent among judges, but that they also can occur in judges of differing
races.
With respect to the impact of race on actual sentencing decisions, studies
have found that on average, black defendants are given longer sentences than
white defendants, and are also more likely to receive the death penalty. 64 In
fact, a study exploring the correlation between race and sentence length in a
Florida prison population found that within white and black subgroups, the
more an inmate possessed Afrocentric physiognomic features, the longer his
sentence. 65
These results have been explained by referencing the
neuroscientific literature cited earlier; 66 since the amygdala responds to
threat, and black individuals are often associated with violent crime, this
stereotype of “black-crime” might induce amygdala-driven threat responses
that subconsciously guide judicial sentencing decisions. 67
Turning to jurors, a study using a mock jury examined the relationship
between implicit racial bias and the interpretation of evidence.68 The
researchers manipulated one piece of evidence between the experimental and
control group, namely whether the hand of a masked gunman in a picture
was light or dark skinned. 69 At the end of the experiment, the majority of
mock jurors were unable to report the skin tone of the person depicted in the
image, yet on average, those who saw the dark skinned version deemed the
defendant to be guiltier than those presented with the light skinned version. 70
In a similar study, researchers incorporated both the Race IAT as well as the
Guilt IAT. 71 When presented with ambiguous evidence and asked to
evaluate the degree to which it informed judgments of guilt or innocence,
those with higher scores on both types of the IAT were more likely to rate
Id.
Id. at 1223–24.
63
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64
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such evidence as supporting a guilty verdict. 72 In other words, participants
who possessed preferences for white faces and more frequently associated
blacks with criminal guilt tended to view vague evidence as a testament to
the defendant’s culpability. Hence, even if implicit racial biases do not
influence the ultimate decisions of mock jurors, at the very least they can
impact how jurors weigh and interpret information provided during a trial. 73
Additionally, in some mock jury studies, researchers have observed “race
salience” effects, whereby white jurors are more likely to convict black
defendants in hypothetical scenarios when the subject of race is not explicitly
called to their attention; however, these jurors are much less likely to convict
when race plays a prominent role in the details of the case. 74 Similar to
Rachlinski and colleagues, 75 researchers have explained these findings
through the lens of social desirability effects, in which white participants
might be making a purposeful effort to avoid displaying any signs of racism
in situations where others might be expecting them to do so. 76
In sum, although there is limited research regarding the impact of
implicit racial biases on actual case outcomes, the studies we do have suggest
that judges and jurors are susceptible to these biases in a way that can
influence evaluations throughout the trial process.
D. Exacerbating Factors
In addition to documenting the prevalence of implicit racial bias,
researchers have also discovered certain factors that can exacerbate these
biases. First, as noted earlier, stereotypes enable us to process information
quickly and make automatic judgments. 77 These fast-paced decisions, which
can lead to the use of negative stereotypes,78 occur more frequently in
situations involving vague information or general uncertainty—two factors
endemic to the trial environment. 79 Second, as seen with social desirability
and race salience effects, individuals do have the capacity to monitor the
influence of implicit or explicit biases under certain circumstances.80
However, this ability requires vigilant self-regulation, 81 and tasks that
involve a high degree of cognitive effort will subsume a significant portion
Id. at 202–03, 208.
Id. at 206.
74
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75
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of one’s mental control capacities. 82 Thus, in situations (much like the
courtroom setting) where individuals must pay close attention to specific
facts and details, the ability to monitor biases will be substantially
decreased. 83 Third, emotions can often compromise decision-making
capacities and heighten the influence of implicit biases.84 In fact, simply
eliciting feelings of disgust prior to taking an IAT can make preferences
against an outgroup more severe. 85 This finding could pose serious concerns
in the courtroom setting if initial visceral reactions in response to the
defendant’s race or the nature of the crime exacerbate the influence of
implicit biases. The amplifying impact of emotions on implicit biases could
also occur if judges or jurors become stressed during trial; when making
evaluations regarding the morality of a situation, stress has been shown to
decrease an individual’s ability to comprehensively take relevant details into
account as well as increase one’s reliance on automatic judgments. 86
Therefore, not only are implicit racial biases a prominent factor during trials,
but the courtroom setting itself can also magnify their influence.
II. PROPOSED STRATEGIES FOR MITIGATION
A. Frequently Proposed Solutions
Given the prevalence of implicit racial biases in the courtroom, multiple
legal scholars and psychologists have suggested strategies for mitigation.
These proposed interventions include (1) raising awareness, (2) screening
with the IAT prior to trial, (3) weakening stereotypical associations, and (4)
increasing diversity among judges and jurors.
Arguments in favor of raising awareness draw support from literature on
self-regulation and active monitoring. 87 In particular, proponents frequently
cite the social desirability and race salience effects discussed above to show
that focusing attention on race can help motivate heightened scrutiny of one’s
own decisions. 88 Similarly, scholars point to research suggesting a
KAHNEMAN, supra note 41, at 41.
See id. (explaining how self-control becomes significantly more difficult when
cognitive resources are already being expended on other tasks); Papillon, supra note
67, at 52.
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87
Rachlinski et al., supra note 8, at 1202–04; Roberts, supra note 10, at 873–74.
88
Rachlinski et al., supra note 8, at 1202–04; Roberts, supra note 10, at 873–74.
82
83

130

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 15, No. 1

connection between motivation and behavior, 89 claiming that if courts make
judges and jurors more aware of implicit racial bias, they will be more
inclined to regulate their own behavior, which will in turn help to reduce the
influence of such biases. 90 In fact, Anna Roberts proposes educating jurors
about implicit racial bias through juror orientation videos, as these materials
are designed to encourage jurors’ sense of civic duty and galvanize them to
contribute their best efforts in the pursuit of justice.91
Turning to the second proposal, some scholars suggest implementing
screening protocols into the jury selection process in order to eliminate those
with strong implicit racial biases. For example, Dale Larson proposes
administering the IAT to potential jurors during voir dire. 92 He contends that
not only would such testing increase the motivation in all jurors to reduce
their biases, but it would also flag individuals who possessed severe biases. 93
This might subsequently facilitate the decision process for attorneys making
challenges for cause, effectively removing these individuals from the jury
pool for that trial. 94 Such a screening strategy would similarly apply to
judges, whereby IAT testing would take place before the assignment of a
judge to a case.
Third, multiple scholars advocate interventions that target the stereotypes
themselves. 95 By weakening the association between black men and violent
crime, for example, the stereotype might become less hardwired and
automatic. 96 Proposed mitigation methods involve presenting people with
counter-stereotypical examples, whether through placing portraits of famous
black historical figures on the wall,97 or by having a black individual proctor
an IAT. 98 Many proponents 99 also cite a 2001 study by Nilanjana Dasgupta
and Anthony Greenwald, in which the presentation of both revered black
Amodio, supra note 26, at 671; WARD, supra note 25, at 219–20.
Kang et al., supra note 8, at 1174–77, 1181–84; Rachlinski et al., supra note
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leaders and disliked white historical figures reduced implicit racial bias
scores. 100 In addition to displaying counter-stereotypical images, researchers
have also explored the use of mental imagery exercises to weaken negative
stereotypes. 101 In fact, mental imagery exercises, in which individuals
visualize certain scenarios, have been shown to be very effective in helping
people carry out goal-directed actions. 102 Researchers attribute these results
to the dynamic nature of imagination and the involvement of the same
sensory activation patterns as those needed in real-life situations. 103 In the
context of implicit biases, studies asking individuals to visualize positive
counter-stereotypes have found considerable success in reducing IAT
scores. 104
The fourth and final commonly proposed intervention 105 involves
diversifying the pool of judges and jurors. 106 Since the mere presence of
someone with an additional perspective can have positive effects on group
decision-making, 107 scholars contend that the presence of judges with
different viewpoints or identity-related characteristics might broaden the
perspectives of their fellow colleagues. 108 With juries, not only do more
Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of
Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired and
Disliked Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 802–08 (2001).
101
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828–29 (2001); Rhiannon N. Turner & Richard J. Crisp, Imagining Intergroup
Contact Reduces Implicit Prejudice, 49 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 129, 135–38 (2010).
See generally Bärbel Knäuper et al., Using Mental Imagery to Enhance the
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successfully reduce implicit stereotypical associations between men and women).
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diverse mock juries display heightened scrutiny and engage in more carefully
reasoned discussions, 109 but the anticipation of serving on a diverse mock
jury can also reduce implicit racial biases. 110 In a study comparing a
homogenous white mock jury to a diverse mock jury, those on the diverse
jury were significantly less likely to consider a black defendant guilty prior
to the group discussion. 111 The author, Samuel Sommers, hypothesizes that
the element of race was made more salient for the white jurors on the diverse
mock jury, who as a result made more concerted efforts to avoid exhibiting
bias; 112 Sommers additionally claims that this diverse panel composition
impacted the way in which jurors interpreted the evidence presented to
them. 113 Furthermore, scholars suggest that enhancing the diversity of jurors
would differentially increase the type or direction of implicit biases within
the jury, which might serve to nullify at least some of these biases. 114
B. Criticisms of Proposed Solutions
Although these suggestions have their merits, all four methods have
serious shortcomings in the courtroom setting. With respect to raising
awareness, increasing motivation to facilitate a fair trial and promoting
knowledge about implicit biases are both laudable goals for obvious reasons.
However, in the context of race, three main concerns arise: (1) these
interventions might not have an appreciable effect on many individuals, (2)
the methods might actually have a counterproductive effect on some people,
and (3) many of the factors known to exacerbate implicit racial biases are
also those required for these interventions to succeed.
As previously mentioned, proponents of raising awareness frequently
cite studies in which individuals demonstrate less biased behavior due to race
salience and social desirability effects.115 Yet, while these studies do exist,
there is also a body of literature suggesting that simply being aware of bias
does not significantly ameliorate its influence.116 For example, recall the
study on the weapon bias effect, where individuals were primed with black or
white faces prior to seeing a tool or a gun, and were explicitly told to avoid
letting the face impact their decisions.117 Despite this warning, participants
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111
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still tended to identify the object as a weapon when primed with a black
face; 118 in other words, calling attention to the risk of implicit racial bias had
a negligible effect on reducing its impact. Moreover, in a longitudinal study
involving various self-regulation strategies, researchers found that
participants in the control group, who simply took the IAT and were told
their results, did not show reduced bias on subsequent IATs. 119 While the
control group in this experiment was not explicitly educated about the
influence and nature of implicit racial biases after taking the IAT, 120 these
findings nevertheless question the assertion that basic awareness can result in
a significant reduction of bias.
Solely raising awareness not only might be futile in many judges and
jurors, but when awareness interventions take the form of emphasizing race
salience or facilitating social desirability effects, the outcome might actually
contribute to the impact of bias rather than mitigate it. This conclusion stems
from a consideration of why implicit racial biases are concerning in the first
place. To start, they might disproportionately increase the probability of a
guilty verdict or a longer sentence for defendants of certain races. Second,
they might play a role in judicial or juror decision-making despite being a
patently extralegal factor. Accentuating race salience and social desirability
effects (by leading white judges and jurors to consciously monitor their own
behavior on the basis of potential racial bias) would likely ameliorate the first
concern. However, the act of making race a central consideration would
simultaneously intensify the second concern. Namely, by taking concerted
efforts to not stereotype a black defendant, the race of the defendant
inevitably becomes an explicit factor in a judge or juror’s thought process.
Furthermore, by amplifying social desirability effects, some individuals
might overcorrect for bias and redress neither the first nor the second
concern. A case that proponents of raising awareness often use to bolster
their argument actually provides an excellent example of this potential
counter-effect. 121 The study gave doctors a hypothetical scenario in which a
patient exhibited specific symptoms, and subsequently asked the doctors to
rate the degree to which they would recommend a certain treatment.122 For
some, this hypothetical involved a black patient, while for others the patient
was white. 123 Doctors with stronger white preferences on the IAT who (a)
saw the version with the black patient and (b) were cognizant of the purpose
of the experiment were much more likely to support administering the
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120
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treatment than their cohorts given the white patient. 124 Importantly, these
compensatory effects did not raise the level of recommendation to be equal
to that given for white patients, but instead surpassed it.125 Thus, social
desirability or race salience effects might funnel the influence of bias in the
opposite direction.
Even if raising awareness did promote less biased behavior, the impact of
such an intervention would rely heavily on active self-regulation and
effortful mental strategies. Yet, as previously mentioned, trials are inherently
stressful and cognitively demanding, 126 so the remaining resources available
to vigilantly monitor one’s bias would be quite limited. 127 Without persistent
self-regulation, significant reductions in implicit racial biases would be
unlikely. 128 Additionally, successfully monitoring one’s biases might come
at the price of not fully focusing on the facts of the case.
The second proposition, screening with the IAT, is also an unsatisfactory
solution. Although this method would likely reduce the net level of implicit
racial bias, there are multiple objections to be made. First, scholars caution
against using the IAT as a diagnostic tool since it was designed to produce
reliable results on an average group level, not to make predictions for
specific individuals. 129 Regardless, incorporating screening methods might
limit the pool from which potential judges or jurors can be drawn. To see
how this might be the case, consider that if such a policy were to be
implemented, it would make sense to screen for those with moderate or
strong preferences in order to substantially reduce the level of implicit racial
bias in the courtroom, at least to a degree that would objectively make
designing, introducing, and enforcing the policy worthwhile. However, data
from an experiment surveying IAT scores across the United States suggests
that the majority of people have more than just a slight bias, and that the
average level of bias varies from state to state. 130 With judges, not only
would screening narrow the pool of those eligible to hear a case, but this also
might cause logistical issues since judges are already limited in number and
have burdensome caseload pressures, particularly at the trial court level. 131
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126
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In the case of jurors, if citizens have a strong interest or a right to serve on a
jury (a question that will be addressed in Part V), then a large number of
people would be barred from accessing this opportunity, especially in a state
with more severe biases on average. As the number of eligible jurors
decreases, the ability of the jury pool to be representative of the community
might also decline. Such a result would be problematic, as the jury pool is
supposed to involve “a fair cross-section of the community.” 132 Although a
pre-screened jury pool would be more impartial with respect to implicit racial
biases, it might not be sufficiently representative or unbiased in other
domains given its limited size. Additionally, requiring judges and jurors to
take the IAT might raise concerns with privacy. 133 Even though judges and
jurors are already asked to divulge personal information during motions for
recusal or voir dire, 134 the fact that individuals are often not cognizant of
their implicit biases might render IAT scores a further breach of privacy than
is currently accepted. In other words, determining an individual’s level of
implicit racial bias goes past what the individual could reveal on her own,
and exposes subconscious thoughts that are socially undesirable.
The third proposition, weakening stereotypes, has its own set of
problems as well. As noted earlier, proponents of this method often invoke
Dasgupta and Greenwald’s study 135 involving portraits of famous historical
figures. 136 However, when a different group of researchers tried to replicate
these results, they found that the stereotypes were harder to break than
previously suggested. 137 In order to determine whether examples of both
positive black figures and negative white figures were necessary to achieve
the effect, the researchers ran an experiment using solely counterstereotypical exemplars of black individuals. 138 Not only did the authors not
observe any significant reduction in implicit racial bias following the
intervention, 139 but also when they added disliked white figures back into the
experiment, the reduction occurred with a substantially smaller effect size
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Roberts, supra note 10, at 856.
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than Dasgupta and Greenwald had reported. 140 Thus, using counterstereotypical pictures to successfully reduce implicit racial biases against
black individuals required encouraging negative stereotypes of white
individuals (at least with this specific protocol). Implementing a strategy that
degrades one group in order to counteract the degradation of another group
seems both counterintuitive and unwarranted, especially if the effects of this
strategy are not as potent as presumed. Granted, other methods exist besides
Dasgupta and Greenwald’s paradigm. For instance, researchers have also
addressed stereotypes by improving white participants’ ability to differentiate
between various black individuals’ faces. 141 By reducing the tendency to
pigeonhole outgroup members into a unified stereotyped category, facial
recognition training can decrease implicit racial bias scores. 142 Yet, not only
does this method provoke race salience issues, but it can also take up to 10
hours 143 to complete, which is an impractical and infeasible timeframe for the
courtroom setting.
Although mental imagery exercises entail a faster process, they are also
unlikely to be productive in the courtroom. For one, these exercises rely
extensively on the cooperative effort of individuals, and there might also be a
large degree of variation in the content and vividness of these simulations
from one person to the next (given idiosyncrasies inherent to imagination).
To achieve a more standardized process, one might suggest simply showing
judges or jurors a video. An experiment employing this approach found
reduced IAT scores after participants watched video clips of black
individuals in positive contexts, such as a family barbeque. 144 However, only
showing one race, even if it avoids presenting negative images of another
race, positions racial factors as an obviously salient issue. Additionally,
despite capturing the dynamic aspect of mental imagery in a systematized
manner, the interactive effects of imaginative exercises, which are considered
one of the most important features for enhancing learning, 145 are lacking in
video-based strategies.
Lastly, while the fourth proposition, diversification, seems the most
promising in principle, this type of intervention by itself would likely still be
Id. at 141.
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insufficient to adequately reduce implicit racial biases across trials. To start,
diversification efforts would mainly be isolated to jurors, since a single judge
hears most cases. Unless we overhaul the current system to make all trial
courts involve a panel of judges, 146 making the pool of judges more diverse
would have negligible effects, as individual judges would still lack the
opportunity to have their opinions or decisions checked by a colleague of a
different perspective during the trial. Put differently, increasing the diversity
among judges might be beneficial for broadening viewpoints or attitudes in
general, but cannot adequately address implicit racial biases when only one
judge manages a case. With juries, despite the fact that group dynamics are a
central feature of their decision-making process, several considerations
complicate diversification efforts. Looking for diverse jurors requires a
definition of diversity, and might lead to quotas or arbitrary decisions about
who is diverse enough to facilitate the desired effects. Moreover, while
heterogeneous groups tend to arrive at more carefully reasoned decisions
than homogenous groups, 147 having too many disparate or competing voices
can hinder cooperation and thwart the original benefits of diversification. 148
Further, diversification interventions would be vulnerable to the issues
discussed above regarding overcompensation from race salience and social
desirability effects. If white jurors start making concerted efforts to not
appear racially biased to jurors of other races, they might form their decisions
in a manner that goes beyond neutrality and instead constitutes bias in the
other direction.
III. VIRTUAL REALITY: A PROOF OF CONCEPT
Implicit racial bias poses serious concerns for the justice system, but
existing proposals for mitigation fall short. Yet, what if alternative methods
could provide a more effective means to reduce implicit racial biases in both
judges and jurors? While the science is still emerging, there is reason to
believe that virtual reality paradigms could meet these criteria in the future,
diminishing the influence of learned stereotypes without relying on selfregulation capabilities.
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Before delving into potential mechanisms, a few disclaimers are in order.
First, for the purposes of this Article, virtual reality is broadly defined as any
technology in which the user experiences and interacts with a virtual
environment, commonly (but not necessarily) through the perspective of an
avatar. Second, because research on the intersection between virtual reality
and the mitigation of implicit racial bias is in its infancy, some of the
methods discussed below have only been tested in a handful of studies with
limited populations and constrained contexts. 149 Third, while this Article
suggests applying these mechanisms to the courtroom setting, none of the
techniques have been explicitly designed, tested, or even envisioned for that
particular purpose. 150 Fourth, some proposals posited below are mere
speculation of ways that certain technologies could be employed in the
courtroom context, and have not been empirically tested. Consequently, the
subsequent section seeks to provide a proof of concept, and present an idea
that has the potential to reduce implicit racial biases in the near future,
without facing the same roadblocks as the proposals put forth in the existing
literature.
A. Visual Imagery and Outgroup Embodiment
Two main assets underlie virtual reality’s promise for the courtroom
setting: standardized, dynamic imagery and outgroup embodiment.
See, e.g., Elizabeth Behm-Morawitz et al., The Effects of Virtual Racial
Embodiment in a Gaming App on Reducing Prejudice, 83 COMM. MONOGRAPHS
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to Address Implicit Race Bias through Active Perspective Taking, 3 GAMES FOR
HEALTH J. 371, 372–76 (2015); Lara Maister et al., Changing Bodies Changes
Minds: Owning Another Body Affects Social Cognition, 19 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE
SCI. 6, 7–10 (2015); Tabitha C. Peck et al., Putting Yourself in the Skin of a Black
Avatar Reduces Implicit Racial Bias, 22 CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 779, 780–86
(2013); Grace S. Yang et al., Effects of Avatar Race in Violent Video Games on
Racial Attitudes and Aggression, 5 SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. J. 698, 699–
702 (2014).
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While virtual reality has not previously been suggested for bias reduction in
the courtroom, some scholars and researchers have advocated for its use in other
domains of criminal justice proceedings, such as for digital reconstructions of crime
scenes and lineups for eyewitness identification. Jeremy N. Bailenson et al.,
Courtroom Applications of Virtual Environments, Immersive Virtual Environments,
and Collaborative Virtual Environments, 28 LAW & POL’Y 249, 254–62 (2006); Lars
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Returning to one of the suggestions from Part II, mental imagery exercises
actively engage participants in the simulation of counter-stereotypes,151 but
individual differences in imagination strategies might prevent these exercises
from producing consistent results.152 Meanwhile, although videos can ensure
that individuals all visualize the same material, they lack the interactive
component that is pivotal for learning.153
Virtual reality could
simultaneously harness the benefits of mental imagery techniques and videos
while circumventing their shortcomings. By designing predetermined
scenarios and allowing individuals to explore virtual worlds via avatars,
virtual reality maintains the interactive and dynamic nature154 of mental
imagery exercises while creating a standardized visual environment.
Additionally, virtual reality enables participants to actively engage with the
simulated environment, facilitating better, and more efficient, learning155
without diminishing cognitive resources.156
In addition to interactive visualization, virtual reality allows individuals
to temporarily experience the world from a different perspective.
Specifically, participants can embody a member of a racial outgroup, which
can reduce the degree to which individuals differentiate outgroup members
from themselves.157 Given that implicit biases often stem from automatic
reactions to potential threats,158 decreasing the “otherness” factor of outgroup
individuals could weaken the implicit stereotypes.159 Moreover, reducing
151

Blair et al., supra note 101, at 828–29; Turner & Crisp, supra note 101, at
135–38.
152
Turner & Crisp, supra note 101, at 139 (noting individuals’ previous
experiences can influence the nature and ease with which they imagine intergroup
contact).
153
Vogel et al., supra note 145, at 233–35.
154
Maria V. Sanchez-Vives & Mel Slater, From Presence to Consciousness
through Virtual Reality, 6 NATURE REVS NEUROSCIENCE 332, 332–34 (2005).
155
Elinda Ai-Lim Lee & Kok Wai Wong, Learning with Desktop Virtual Reality:
Low Spatial Ability Learners Are More Positively Affected, 79 COMPUTERS & EDUC.
49, 51, 55 (2014); Barney Dalgarno et al., The Contribution of 3D Environments to
Conceptual Understanding, in WINDS OF CHANGE IN THE SEA OF LEARNING 149, 151
(O.J. McKerrow ed., 2002).
156
Dalgarno et al., supra note 155, at 152; Lee & Wong, supra note 155, at 49,
51.
157
Behm-Morawitz et al., supra note 149, at 398–400.
158
Amodio, supra note 26, at 671.
159
See Sylvia Terbeck et al., β-Adrenoceptor Blockade Modulates Fusiform
Gyrus Activity to Black versus White Faces, 232 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 2951,
2956 (2015) (discussing neural reaction times to ingroup versus outgroup faces, and
suggesting that speeding up the reaction time for processing outgroup faces might
serve to reduce implicit racial biases); Andrew R. Todd et al., Perspective Taking
Combats Automatic Expressions of Racial Bias, 100 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1027, 1027–39 (2011).
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self-other distinctions through outgroup embodiment has been shown to
increase empathy and positive feelings towards members of the outgroup in
question. 160 Importantly, taking the perspective of just one member of an
outgroup can produce results that transfer to the outgroup as a whole,
allowing virtual embodiment exercises to render large-scale effects using
small-scale paradigms. 161
In the courtroom context, visual imagery and outgroup embodiment
could be implemented in at least two forms: digital games and immersive
virtual environments.
1. Digital Games
Digital games (such as computer and video games) offer a relatively lowtech method to achieve these benefits. 162 While games have not yet been
developed for implicit bias reduction in the justice system, 163 future efforts
could build on the design of Bernd Wittenbrick and colleagues’ video-based
study 164 to more subtly present counter-stereotypical situations. For instance,
an avatar could walk through a park, where families of multiple races are
enjoying barbeques, reading on a bench, playing fetch with a dog, and so
forth. The avatar could interact and engage with the other people in the park
by joining and participating in their activities. An alternative setup could
involve a goal-oriented game, in which players must perform predetermined
Behm-Morawitz et al., supra note 149, at 399–400.
Nick Yee & Jeremy Bailenson, Walk a Mile in Digital Shoes: The Impact of
Embodied Perspective-Taking on The Reduction of Negative Stereotyping in
Immersive Virtual Environments, refereed presentation at the Cleveland State
University Proceedings of PRESENCE: The 9th Annual International Workshop on
Presence
147,
148,
154
(Aug.
24-26,
2006),
http://astro.temple.edu/~lombard/ISPR/Proceedings/2006/P2006proceedings.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U8NB-E8CY].
162
See Gutierrez et al., supra note 149 at 372.
163
A few studies have explored the impact of digital games on implicit bias in
general. Unfortunately, these designs involve highly race-salient scenarios, and thus
are not applicable to the current context. See Gutierrez et al., supra note 149 at 372–
76, for a discussion that found implicit racial biases were lower for participants with
high empathy, and Grace S. Yang et al., supra note 149, at 699–702, for a discussion
on heightened implicit racial biases resulting from reinforcement of the “black menviolent crime” stereotype. Additionally, one research team recently conducted a
study in which white participants created an avatar (in a way that minimized race
salience issues) and explored a basic virtual setting in an online game. Although the
study did not examine implicit biases, the authors found an increase in positive
explicit attitudes towards black individuals among participants who played with
black avatars compared to those who played with white avatars. Behm-Morawitz et
al., supra note 149, at 411.
164
Wittenbrick et al., supra note 95, at 817–18.
160
161
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actions to earn points. In either game design, black individuals would subtly
be presented in positive, counter-stereotypical contexts while participants
engaged in normal, mundane activities via an outgroup avatar. Importantly,
the outgroup identity of the avatar would need to involve multiple
characteristics to avoid race salience effects. For example, the outgroup
identity could entail someone of a different race, age, gender, and
socioeconomic status, 165 which could encourage open attitudes towards
outgroups in general as opposed to a specified race. In addition, these games
could contain mandatory steps that the player must take in order to ensure
engaged compliance with the digital exercise.
2. Immersive Virtual Environments
Whereas digital games could reduce bias using outgroup avatars in
counter-stereotypical scenarios, immersive virtual environments could take
this design one step further. In immersive virtual environments, participants
wear a head-mounted display that replaces all visual input from their actual
surroundings with pre-designed simulations. 166 By tracking users’ head and
body movements, the technology allows participants to interact with the
setting in a way that strongly mimics real life.167
Instead of simply personifying an animated character in a digital game,
immersive virtual environments can induce body ownership illusions, in
which individuals temporarily feel as though another person’s body part is in
fact their own. 168 Unsurprisingly, these illusions are particularly effective in
reducing self-other distinctions. 169 In an experiment employing this concept,
Tabitha Peck and colleagues 170 had participants enter a virtual environment
where a mirror reflected back an image of their avatar. When the participant
moved his own limbs in front of the mirror, the reflection moved in an
identically synchronous way. 171 Light-skinned participants who were given a
darker skinned avatar in the virtual setting demonstrated reduced implicit
racial biases following the experiment.172 A similar technique could be
Socioeconomic status could be portrayed via work uniforms. See Jonathan B.
Freeman et al., Looking the Part: Social Status Cues Shape Race Perception, 6 PLOS
ONE e25107, 2 (Sept. 26, 2011), http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0025107
[https://perma.cc/L2LH-Q6NV] (using work uniforms, such as business suits and
janitor outfits, to depict social status in a computer-based perception study).
166
Sanchez-Vives & Slater, supra note 154, at 332–33.
167
Id. at 333-34.
168
Lara Maister et al., supra note 149, 7–10.
169
Id.
170
Peck et al., supra note 149, at 780–86.
171
Id. at 780–82.
172
Id. at 782–86. The findings from this study contradict the only other existing
study on immersive virtual environments and implicit racial biases. Groom et al.,
165
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especially potent in the courtroom setting. Judges and jurors could enter an
immersive virtual environment via the perspective of an outgroup member,
and examine their “new” bodies in front of a mirror. As mentioned in the
discussion of digital games, 173 the identity of the avatar should be
multifaceted to reduce issues with race salience.
With respect to practical questions regarding time and cost restraints,
immersive virtual environments would not pose excessive burdens. Basic
setups involve a head-mounted display, headphones for sound perception,
and motion tracking sensors; 174 however some setups, such as Google
Cardboard, simply require a smartphone and a headset. 175 Multiple
individuals could use the equipment, and head-mounted displays are now
being sold as consumer products, with prices ranging from approximately
$20 (e.g., Google Cardboard) 176 to $150 (e.g., VisusVR). 177 Additionally,
even though immersive virtual environments require extra time to set up the
head-mounted display and orient the individual, studies involving this
technique often last for only a few minutes once the participant enters the
virtual environment. 178
In sum, virtual reality tasks, whether through digital games or immersive
virtual environments, could dampen automatic reactions to members of other
races in a manner that is standardized, interactive, engaging, and feasible.
Crucially, these methods could achieve such results without confronting the

supra note 149, 231–45. Groom and colleagues’ study found increased implicit
racial bias scores after individuals participated in the virtual reality paradigm. Id.
However, as Peck et al. note, Groom and colleagues’ study involved crucial
differences that might explain the divergence in results. Id. For instance, the virtual
world was more complex, body ownership was not included as an explicit factor, and
the paradigm involved a job interview, in which race discrimination is a common
occurrence. Peck et al., supra note 149, at 785.
173
See infra Part III.A.1.
174
See Soo Youn Oh et al., Immersion at Scale: Researcher’s Guide to
Ecologically Valid Mobile Experiments, presentation at the Clemson University
School of Computing conference for IIEE Virtual Reality (Mar. 22, 2016),
https://vhil.stanford.edu/mm/2016/01/oh-vr-immersion-at-scale.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GLD3-VTPE] (using and describing a basic setup for mobile
virtual reality experiments with fewer and cheaper pieces of equipment than in a
traditional virtual reality laboratory setting).
175
Get Your Cardboard, CARDBOARD, https://vr.google.com/cardboard/getcardboard/ [https://perma.cc/NJ8D-26UG] (last visited Sept. 23, 2016).
176
Cardboard V2.0, I AM CARDBOARD, http://www.imcardboard.com/cardboardv2-0.html [https://perma.cc/TB22-M4Q8] (last visited Feb. 10, 2016).
177
VisusVR Visus, VISUSVR, http://www.visusvr.com/products/visusvr-visus
[https://perma.cc/6CRF-KDPN] (last visited Feb. 10, 2016).
178
See, e.g., Peck et al., supra note 149, at 785 (placing participants in virtual
world for approximately 12 minutes).

2016

UNCONVENTIONAL METHODS

143

same pitfalls as the previously suggested measures. 179 As opposed to
strategies aimed at raising awareness, virtual reality exercises do not rely
heavily on self-regulation throughout the trial. They do not weaken
stereotypes by pitting one race against another, nor do they take multiple
hours to complete. Unlike diversification proposals, virtual reality applies to
both jurors and judges, and whereas screening methods automatically
exclude many members of the population from serving as a judge or juror,
virtual reality exercises could train anyone who is currently eligible to serve.
Lastly, virtual reality paradigms can involve nuanced and intricate design
features, allowing race to be subtly presented without making it an unduly
salient factor.
B. The Need for Tailored Research Efforts
Although digital games and immersive virtual environments could
become effective tools in the future, tailored research efforts are necessary to
move these techniques from theoretical possibilities into viable solutions.
Specifically, future experiments will need to address (1) the strength, scope,
and duration of effects, and (2) the degree to which individual differences
produce variable results.
To start, researchers should not only explore the extent of bias reduction
on measures like the IAT, but also on assessments of evidence and
presumptions of innocence. Importantly, virtual reality exercises would need
to achieve these results without creating collateral impacts, such as altering
other cognitive processes or influencing the decision-making process in
unforeseen ways. Otherwise, unintended consequences could nullify the
exercises’ benefits by producing counterproductive results. In addition to
scope and strength, future research must determine the longevity of the
effects, and determine whether acceptable standards for durability might
differ between judges and jurors. For instance, judges are consistently in the
courtroom setting and would have a continuous need for bias reduction. In
contrast, since jurors’ responsibilities terminate at the end of the trial, the
exercises’ effects should be proportional to the length of their courtroom
duties. Compared to digital games, immersive virtual environments would
likely generate stronger, longer-lasting effects due to their more vicarious
and life-like nature. 180 Until further research measures are taken, it is
difficult to predict the precise duration of effects; yet, existing research
See, e.g., infra Part III.A.1.
Cf. Sun Joo Ahn et al., Short- and Long-Term Effects of Embodied
Experiences in Immersive Virtual Environments on Environmental Locus of Control
and Behavior, 39 COMPUTERS IN HUM. BEHAV. 235, 239–40 (2014) (comparing the
strength of effects between video-based methods and immersive virtual
environments, and discussing the important roles of interaction and realism for
delivering stronger results in immersive virtual environments).
179
180
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suggests that effects of immersive virtual environments could reasonably
endure for at least one week. 181 Research also indicates that closer tracking
of head and body movements can lead to more potent results. 182
Consequently, the design of the immersive virtual environment paradigm
could be more highly advanced in the case of judges to produce longerlasting effects.
However, these statements are merely speculative;
accordingly, future research should identify which technique (between digital
games or immersive virtual environments) is more efficacious, simple, and
cost-sensitive to implement.
Not only are questions of strength, scope, and duration essential to
resolve, but in order for virtual reality to be useful, it must also reliably
produce the intended effects in the majority of individuals. If the techniques
were only successful in a small portion of the population, the overall
reduction in implicit racial bias might be too subtle to make the costs of
implementation worthwhile. Thus, systematic research would need to
specifically examine the extent to which individual differences might
modulate results.
As a starting point, researchers should replicate the studies mentioned in
Part I using mock trial scenarios,183 and explore whether and to what degree
virtual reality training reduces implicit racial biases (compared to a control
group). Such a study could be expanded to involve multiple versions of the
techniques, which could range in levels of complexity, and include
individuals of different ages, races, and backgrounds. These studies should
also entail follow-up tests to provide longitudinal data on the exercises’
effects.
Although virtual reality is not ready for implementation in the
courtroom, it is important to note that some crucial groundwork has already
been laid. To start, digital games and immersive virtual environments are
becoming increasingly mainstream, 184 and continue to be extrapolated to
novel domains. 185 By the time sufficient research has been conducted for its
Id. at 237–42.
James J. Cummings & Jeremy N. Bailenson, How Immersive is Enough? A
Meta-Analysis of the Effect of Immersive Technology on User Presence, 19 MEDIA
PSYCHOL. 1, 26–27 (2015).
183
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use in the courtroom setting, virtual reality will likely no longer be regarded
as a futuristic or novel phenomenon. As a result, people might express less
initial aversion to virtual reality if they feel more comfortable with the
technology in the first place. Second, the presence and influence of implicit
racial biases are becoming a more discussed issue not only among scholars,
but also among the general public. 186 Within the past year, there has been a
surge of newspaper articles, blog posts, and other media forums calling
attention to the problem and expressing a need for change. 187 Third,
technological measures are already being used to enact systemic reform in
the justice system. 188 For instance, discrepancies in the setting of bail across
similar cases have revealed problems with implicit racial bias, the limitations
of judicial discretion, and a failure of common practice to meet its intended
purpose. 189 In response, multiple jurisdictions have implemented an
algorithmic method, which is designed to more objectively assess potential
risk and facilitate judges in setting bail. 190 While initial acceptance of the
measure was met with resistance, those jurisdictions that have integrated it
into the decision-making process have become more confident in the fairness
and legitimacy of the justice system. 191 Together, these recent developments
suggest that virtual reality training is not a purely hypothetical proposal: the
technology is becoming more widespread, the general public is aware and
concerned about the issue of implicit racial bias, and steps towards systemic
change in the courtroom have already been set in motion.
IV. VIRTUAL REALITY IN CONTEXT: THE CASE OF JUDGES
To concretize the idea of virtual reality in the courtroom, this Part
examines how such methods could be applied to judges presiding over
criminal cases. 192 Judges hold a unique position in the legal realm, as they
benefits-of-video-games/ [https://perma.cc/L2HK-C4D3].
186
E.g., Eva Paterson, Unintentional Discrimination Is as Harmful as Real Bias,
TIMES
(Apr.
27,
2015,
6:45
AM),
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/04/27/can-discrimination-existwithout-clear-intent/unintentional-discrimination-is-as-harmful-as-real-bias
[https://perma.cc/J9LY-TWTF]; Maanvi Singh, So You Flunked a Racism Test. Now
What?,
NPR
(Aug.
4,
2015,
8:03
AM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2015/08/04/416827667/so-you-flunked-aracism-test-now-what [https://perma.cc/6CFG-5TFV] (highlighting the increased
prevalence of implicit bias discussions in mainstream news and media sources).
187
Id.
188
Shaila Dewan, Judges Replacing Conjecture with Formula for Bail, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 2015, at A18.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
While this Article’s scope is confined to criminal trials, it is important to note
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not only choose to enter into their professional role, but also serve as the
tangible face of the justice system. Additionally, judges play a prominent
part in influencing trial outcomes through managing the trial, determining the
admissibility of evidence and appropriateness of certain statements, and
ultimately rendering the sentencing decision. 193 Given judges’ direct
involvement in each case they hear, problems stemming from biased
judgments are particularly concerning.
Moreover, the strength of
stereotypical associations between criminality and race might be even more
potent in judges than in the general public; since black individuals comprise
a disproportionately high percentage of the defendant population, judges
might possess skewed perceptions of criminal trends. 194
The subsequent section outlines two policies for implementing virtual
reality training among judges, highlighting associated benefits for multiple
players in the courtroom system. After addressing possible objections to
these policies, this section contends that judges should be expected to
participate in virtual reality training exercises. In order to simplify the
following discussion, assume that in the near future, virtual reality methods
will be effective, targeted in scope, and ready to implement in the courtroom
setting.
A. Virtual Reality Training: Painting the Picture
Implementing virtual reality training could potentially take one of two
forms: a voluntary policy or a mandatory policy. In a voluntary policy,
judges would be informed about implicit biases in the courtroom and
provided with information about the virtual reality exercises (including facts
about the strength, scope, and duration of the training’s effects). 195 Judges
would then have the option to participate in the exercises prior to trials.
Depending on how long the effects last, judges could perform the exercises
before opening statements, or potentially during continuing judicial
education seminars (should the effects be sufficiently durable). In contrast to
a voluntary policy, a mandatory process would make virtual reality exercises
that implicit racial biases are also a concern in civil cases. See Kang et al., supra
note 8, at 1152–68.
193
Id. at 1146.
194
See Papillon, supra note 67, at 53 (noting the overrepresentation of black
convicts in the criminal justice system, and the impact of this fact on perceptions of
black individuals’ propensity to engage in criminal behavior).
195
In order to avoid any race salience effects that might arise in explaining the
reason for virtual reality, judges would likely be informed of the problem of implicit
bias as a general phenomenon. This instruction should not be viewed as deceptive,
since even though the exercises are targeted at implicit racial biases in particular, the
reductions in automatic self-other distinctions are generalizable and impact the
fundamental processes underlying many types of implicit biases.
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a requisite aspect of the judicial profession; individuals would not be forced
to participate in the exercises, but would have to agree to them in order to
enter or remain in the profession. Since individuals are not required to
become judges, this policy will be referred to as “pseudo-compulsory” for
the remainder of this Article. Importantly, in either policy, the training
would serve as a supplemental tool to judicial decision-making (as opposed
to a technological solution to implicit racial biases), and should accurately be
portrayed as such when explained to judges. 196
B. Benefits of the Policies
In order to appreciate the full benefit of virtual reality training, consider
the three main parties impacted: (1) the defendant on trial, (2) the justice
system at large, and (3) the individual judge participating in the training. 197
Starting with defendants, if a judge chooses to engage in the training (and
assuming it successfully attenuates his implicit racial biases), defendants
might be more likely to be presumed innocent from the beginning of the
hearing. Reducing implicit racial biases would also boost the justice
system’s legitimacy—by increasing a judge’s capacity to interpret evidence
in an equitable manner, the justice system could better meet its goal of
facilitating fair and impartial trials. Plus, if the trial system better fulfilled
this intended purpose, citizens would be more confident in their likelihood of
receiving a fair trial should they ever find themselves in the position of a
defendant. With respect to the individual judge, participating in virtual
reality training could conceivably facilitate more adequate compliance with
professional and legal duties. Not only is impartiality a professional
obligation, 198 but the inability to be impartial also constitutes legal grounds
for disqualification from a trial. 199 To the extent that individuals derive
benefits from better performance in their chosen line of work, the judge
might additionally gain personal satisfaction from more adeptly carrying out
his role.

Framing the technology as a supplemental tool was crucial to the success of
the algorithm-based bail measure discussed in Part IV, supra. See Dewan, supra
note 188.
197
Dewan, supra note 188 (discussing how implicit racial biases can impact
judges when setting bail, leading to negative impacts on individual defendants, and
de-legitimatizing the justice system as a whole).
198
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.2–2.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
199
28 U.S.C. § 144 (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012).
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C. Potential Objections

Despite the associated benefits, some individuals might consider virtual
reality programs a controversial proposal. Specifically, two main concerns
might arise: freedom of thought and coercion. 200
1. Freedom of Thought
Given that the virtual reality exercises target automatic and hardwired
judgments, one might worry that courts (or the parties responsible for
designing the paradigms) are “brainwashing” judges—by covertly reducing
implicit racial biases, virtual reality programs might shift the very way that
judges view and perceive the world around them. However, if the exercises
work as expected, virtual reality training should not be conceptualized as a
brainwashing phenomenon. By asking people to view their avatar in a
mirror, or explore a mundane virtual setting, the exercises are not implanting
thoughts into individuals’ minds, erasing opinions about race, or dictating
what people should believe. 201 Given that explicit beliefs are often
inconsistent with one’s implicit biases, 202 it is highly unlikely that the
exercises would alter the judge’s personality, attitudes, or opinions. 203 Yet,
even if the exercises would not “brainwash” judges, virtual reality would
influence the nature or likelihood of making certain automatic judgments.
As a result, the more fundamental question might concern freedom of
thought and the interference with a judge’s underlying mental processes.
While freedom of thought merits respect, there are two counterarguments
to note. First, multiple scholars contend that automatic processes, like
implicit biases or impulses, actually decrease one’s capacity for mental
control, particularly when these biases diverge from one’s explicit
See infra Parts IV.C.1, IV.C.2.
Not only does the design of these exercises avoid portraying any explicit
message, but the mechanisms driving the effects are also primarily based on bottomup sensory perception, as opposed to top-down executive processing. See Lara
Maister & Manos Tsakiris, The Plasticity of Self-Other Boundaries: From Body
Ownership to Social Cognition, in 2 CONCEPTUAL AND INTERACTIVE EMBODIMENT:
FOUNDATIONS OF EMBODIED COGNITION 178–82 (Martin H. Fischer & Yann Coello
eds., 2015) (discussing neural mechanisms underlying body ownership illusions,
highlighting the influence of somatosensory and motor mirror systems).
202
Banaji et al., supra note 9, at 57–58.
203
By reducing self-other distinctions, it is possible that the opinions or attitudes
of those who are explicitly racist might be modulated to some degree. In other
words, for those whose implicit and explicit biases do not align, attenuating implicit
biases could potentially have an impact on the strength of the explicit bias. Even if
this were the case, these individuals would theoretically have already been removed
from the judiciary as a result of their explicit prejudice.
200
201
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attitudes. 204 By clouding a person’s ability to thoroughly exercise his
consciously held beliefs or opinions, implicit biases can impair freedom of
thought and autonomous decision-making in their own right. 205 Second,
under both voluntary and pseudo-compulsory policies, judges would have to
agree to participate in the training, knowing that it modulates mental
processes to some degree. If judges make an informed choice to do so, then
respecting freedom of thought and autonomy simultaneously entails honoring
judges’ decisions. 206 Considering the nature of the exercises and the
volitional facet of the policies, virtual reality training should not be
considered an objectionable impediment to freedom of thought.
2. Coercion
When evaluating the policies’ respect for freedom of thought,
particularly in the pseudo-compulsory case, critics might raise the question of
coercion; namely, would judges truly be making an unburdened, autonomous
decision to participate in the training? The short answer to this question is
“yes.” Coercion typically entails three main criteria: (1) reducing an
individual’s available choices, (2) negatively impacting the individual and
depriving him of something to which he is entitled, and (3) intentionally
manipulating the individual to achieve a certain outcome. 207 The pseudocompulsory policy fails to meet any of these elements.
Starting with the first requirement (reducing available options), one
could claim that the judge’s choice set has been limited: whereas current or
aspiring judges previously had the option to serve without agreeing to the
training, this choice is no longer available. However, it is not entirely clear
that a judge’s choice set has been narrowed as opposed to merely
complicated through additional conditions. Remember that professions
contain a set of requirements with which members must comply, and failure
to meet such obligations bars individuals from entering or remaining in that
occupation. 208 Consequently, the choice set for judges can be viewed as (a)
Bublitz, supra note 84, at 9; Thomas Douglas, Moral Enhancement, 25 J.
APPLIED PHIL. 228, 231 (2008).
205
Bublitz, supra note 84, at 9; Douglas, supra note 204, at 231.
206
See 3 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO
SELF 43 (1986) (noting that autonomy involves making decisions for oneself,
including being responsible for consequences that ensue as a result of the decision).
207
ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 202–21 (1987); Jennifer S. Hawkins &
Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Clarifying Confusions about Coercion, 35 HASTINGS CENTER
REP. 16, 17 (2005).
208
See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Scope (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011) (“The
Canons state overarching principles of judicial ethics that all judges must observe.
Although a judge may be disciplined only for violating a Rule, the Canons provide
important guidance in interpreting the Rules”).
204
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comply with the obligations required for the profession or (b) lose your
qualification to hold this position. Although the stipulations have changed
under the pseudo-compulsory policy, this overall option set stays the same.
Whether or not we believe that options have been reduced, the more
questionable claims are that judges are worse off as a result of the policy, and
that they have been deprived of something to which they are entitled (i.e., the
second requirement for coercion). 209 In the case of judges currently sitting
on the bench, one might argue that making them resign from their position
for failure to consent to the training would have a negative impact on their
lives; they would lose their job, their financial security, their self-identity,
and the ability to work in a role about which they might be fervently
passionate. For those aspiring to enter the profession, withholding their
consent and forfeiting their eligibility might undermine all of the effort and
resources that these individuals had invested in order to one day have the
opportunity to serve as a judge. Although these consequences might exist, it
seems strange to afford them much weight. These “negative” impacts
concern infringing upon an individual’s interest in being a judge; yet, the
virtual reality exercises would enable judges to better perform their jobs,
uphold fundamental values of the position, and theoretically promote the
very interest in question. Regardless, the pseudo-compulsory policy would
not deprive judges of a right. There is no right to be a judge, let alone to
have any particular job. Moreover, as stated earlier, every profession contains
a set of rules that its members are expected to follow, simply by virtue of
being in that profession. Judges choose to accept these obligations, and
would only be faced with this pseudo-compulsory decision if they voluntarily
elected to join the judiciary, which is something they are in no way
compelled to do, nor are entitled to do. 210
Moving to the third element of coercion (manipulative intent), one could
theoretically contend that the government creates this restrictive choice set
for the sole purpose of facilitating its desired outcome. Assuming that judges
have a strong interest in keeping their positions, they might consent to the
exercises (even against their preferred wishes) in order to qualify for the
profession. As a result, these judges would directly perpetuate the
government’s goals and interests. However, this argument is tenuous at best.
While judges might weigh the virtual reality exercises differently than they
would if the consequence did not entail losing their jobs, the purpose of the
policy and the intentions behind it are not focused on making judges
succumb to the government’s desires. Instead, the policy is designed to
enhance the fairness of the justice system, create positive benefits for
WERTHEIMER, supra note 207, at 202–21; Hawkins & Emanuel, supra note
207, at 17 (explaining that coercion typically entails the deprivation of an entitlement
that leaves the coerced party worse off).
210
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT.
209
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citizens, and enable judges to more adequately meet their professional and
legal duties.
D. The Case for a Pseudo-Compulsory System
Thus far, this Article has argued that (a) voluntary and pseudocompulsory policies would bring substantial benefits to the courtroom, and
(b) that both setups could be justifiably implemented. Although a voluntary
scheme would constitute a less drastic measure, a pseudo-compulsory system
should be the ultimate goal for two main reasons: equitable access and
distributed burdens. First, a pseudo-compulsory policy enables every
defendant to access the benefits of bias reduction, not just those who happen
to be assigned a judge who elected to participate in the training. Second, if a
system with less biased judges enhances the legitimacy of both the judiciary
and the trial process as a whole, only those who engaged in the training
would be supplying these benefits. While some judges would be taking on
an extra burden, those who refused to participate would reap the advantages
of this fairer trial system without providing the necessary contributions
themselves. 211
Integrating virtual reality training into professional
requirements through a pseudo-compulsory policy would allocate each judge
a role in bringing about the policy’s benefits. Accordingly, while both
voluntary and pseudo-compulsory policies would improve the status quo, the
latter more closely aligns with the justice system’s respect for fairness and
equity. 212
However, since virtual reality training would present a large departure
from current practice, incremental implementation is advisable. Courts could
first introduce training on a voluntary basis, allowing judges sufficient time
to build familiarity with the exercises. Once the training programs had a
211
See generally Alan Wertheimer, Liberty, Coercion, and the Limits of the State,
in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 57 (Robert L.
Simon ed., 2002) (discussing the Justice Principle and free-riding).
212
While a pseudo-compulsory policy might sound severe, it is worth noting that
a similar setup already exists in the medical setting. Take the case of mandatory
vaccinations for health care workers, which some states and hospitals currently
require. See State Immunization Laws for Healthcare Workers and Patients,
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Nov. 19, 2014),
http://www2a.cdc.gov/vaccines/statevaccsApp/AdministrationbyPatientType.asp?Pat
ientTypetmp=Hospital%20Employees#1 [https://perma.cc/3QZT-WMZ3] (for a list
of voluntary and mandatory immunization policies for each state). The comparison
between health care workers and judges can be made on multiple levels—health care
workers choose to enter the profession, have duties to protect and serve both
individuals and the broader public, professional obligations require them to take
certain actions that prevent harm to patients and the health care system at large, and
finally, failure to comply with such requirements compromises their ability to
adequately perform their job.
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chance to gain traction, courts could then transition to pseudo-compulsory
policies. Even though voluntary approaches are not ideal for the reasons
mentioned above, obtaining internal support among the judiciary is crucial
for the program’s ultimate success, and any reduction in implicit racial bias
would be an improvement over the present system.
V. VIRTUAL REALITY AND JURIES
While the judiciary is a sensible starting point for bias reduction training,
judges are not the only population in the courtroom setting affected by
implicit racial biases. As mentioned in Part I, studies with mock jurors
highlight the strong influence that biases can have on interpretations of
information and evaluations of guilt. 213 In contrast to the argument for
judges, the analysis for jurors is significantly more complicated given the
unique characteristics and protections afforded to juries. 214 Additionally,
cultural acceptance of training policies might be more difficult to achieve
since jury service is not an optional duty, 215 and logistical barriers might arise
considering the size of juries (as compared to a single judge). 216
Nevertheless, given the prevalence and impact of implicit racial biases, it is
worth extending the analysis to the jury, one of the most influential decisionmaking groups in the courtroom setting. The subsequent section follows a
similar framework to the discussion of judges, explaining what the respective
policies might look like, addressing relevant benefits and potential concerns,
and analyzing the unique demands of the juror role.
A. Virtual Reality Training Policies
As with judges, virtual reality training with jurors could be voluntary or
pseudo-compulsory. In a voluntary scheme, upon being summoned for jury
service, potential jurors would be informed of the problem of implicit biases
Kang et al., supra note 8, at 1142–52; Larson, supra note 10, at 154–58;
Levinson et al., supra note 39, at 207; Levinson & Young, supra note 53, at 344–45;
Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 10, at 220–21.
214
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 606 (explaining protected status of jury’s deliberative
process, noting that jurors cannot testify about their conversations or the thought
processes involved in their decision); ANDREW G. FERGUSON, WHY JURY DUTY
MATTERS: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO CONSTITUTIONAL ACTION 12–21 (2013) (noting
the special and distinct nature of jury service).
215
28 U.S.C. § 1866(g) (2012).
216
For example, completing the virtual reality training with each juror before trial
might take longer than completing the exercises with a single judge, and larger
quantities of the necessary equipment would likely be required as well. While this is
by no means a complete list of potential logistical factors, a full analysis of the
practical considerations is beyond the scope of this Article.
213
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in the courtroom and given facts about virtual reality exercises. Jurors would
then have the option to participate in the training prior to the start of the trial,
and could potentially perform the exercises while waiting to be called for
voir dire, 217 as a supplement to the orientation videos that jurors are already
expected to watch. 218 A pseudo-compulsory policy, on the other hand, would
make the exercises a requisite aspect of jury service. In order to only
conduct voir dire with those who could actually meet the requirements of the
juror role, potential jurors would be given the option to consent to the
training prior to the jury selection process. Only those jurors who agreed to
the training would continue with voir dire, and if selected would partake in
the exercises before the trial commenced. However, to prevent virtual reality
training from simply providing an easy excuse to avoid serving, individuals
who declined to give their consent would be required to fulfill some other
civic duty. 219
B. Benefits of the Policies
Mirroring the argument for judges, a juror’s choice to participate in the
training confers benefits to the defendant on trial, the justice system at large,
and the juror participating in the exercises. By reducing their implicit racial
biases, jurors would help facilitate a defendant’s right to a fair trial, promote
the presumption of innocence, and enable the justice system to better meet its
intended purpose. Moreover, since jurors are required to hear cases
impartially, 220 virtual reality exercises would allow individuals to better
Ideally, jurors would be asked to make their decision prior to voir dire so that
their choice to participate would not be influenced by the jury selection process.
Otherwise, if the willingness to consent to participate was a subject during voir dire,
potential jurors might be swayed to answer in a manner counter to their actual
preferences. Returning to the social desirability effects mentioned in Part I, potential
jurors might give their consent when asked in the presence of the attorneys and judge
in order to conform to what they believe is expected from them. Alternatively, one
could also imagine that potential jurors might decline to give their consent when
asked during voir dire solely as a strategy to get out of jury service. Requiring a
decision before voir dire might circumvent these issues.
218
See JODY GEORGE ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., HANDBOOK ON JURY USE IN
THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 63–64 (1989) (describing the orientation process,
including the frequent use of videos).
219
The exact nature of this civic duty is beyond the scope of this Article, but
some safeguards would be necessary to prevent virtual reality exercises from
becoming a pretense for not serving for reasons separate from the training exercises
themselves.
220
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed”); 28 U.S.C. § 1866(c) (2012) (“any person summoned for jury
service may be . . . excluded by the court on the ground that such person may be
217
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perform their civic and legal duties.
While both voluntary and pseudo-compulsory schemes would achieve
these benefits, the same arguments introduced in Part IV.D apply to jurors.
With a pseudo-compulsory policy, all members of all juries would have
attenuated implicit racial biases (at least to some degree). Compared to a
voluntary policy, a pseudo-compulsory system would ensure each defendant
access to a less biased jury, and could potentially produce greater reductions
in overall bias—having 12 less partial jurors is conceivably more desirable
than having only a select few (depending on how many jurors decided to
participate in the voluntary scheme). A pseudo-compulsory system would
also distribute the burdens more equally across jurors, and perhaps across the
citizenry in general (given that jury service is a mandatory civic duty). 221
And so, while both policies could facilitate more impartial trials, a pseudocompulsory policy would likely deliver greater benefits. Nevertheless, as
argued in Part IV.D, a voluntary policy would be a desirable starting place to
incrementally build momentum and support for the training before
transitioning to pseudo-compulsory requirements.
C. Potential Objections
In addition to freedom of thought and coercion, one might also worry
about the representativeness of the jury (e.g., obtaining a jury of one’s peers
and a fair cross-section of the community). 222 Although the analysis for
freedom of thought is largely identical to the argument put forth for judges,
the latter two issues (representativeness of the jury and coercion) present
unique considerations in the jury context.
1. A Representative Jury
Within the issue of representation, there are two similar but distinct
questions. First, would the virtual reality exercises, by reducing implicit
racial biases, modulate jurors in such a way that they no longer qualify as a
defendant’s “peers”? Second, is there a certain type of individual who is
more likely to consent to the exercises, thereby diminishing the likelihood of
obtaining a fair cross-section of the community? 223
With respect to the first question, it is highly unlikely that virtual reality
training would create a “superclass” of potential jurors. As mentioned in the
discussion on freedom of thought, 224 the exercises would not fundamentally
unable to render impartial jury service”).
221
28 U.S.C. § 1866(g) (describing jury service as a mandatory civic duty).
222
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975).
223
Id.
224
See supra Part IV.C.1.
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alter personalities or opinions, 225 especially given that implicit racial biases
often diverge from individuals’ consciously held beliefs. 226 Further, it is
unlikely that the virtual reality techniques would wholly eliminate biases, 227
let alone reduce all jurors’ biases to the exact same level.
While the law does not explicitly define the term “peer,” the Supreme
Court has linked the notion to citizenship, 228 and declared that juries must
represent a fair cross-section of a defendant’s contemporary, local
community. 229 Yet, as the Supreme Court has stated, there is “no
requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and
reflect the various distinctive groups in the population. Defendants are not
entitled to a jury of any particular composition.” 230 Returning to the context
in question, most people in the population possess at least some level of
implicit racial bias, and the extent of this bias can vary from one person to
the next. 231 While jurors who participate in the virtual reality training might
exhibit lower levels of bias on average, the law does not require juries to
mimic the precise distribution of personal characteristics within a
community. 232 As a result, even if jurors differ from members of their
community with respect to implicit racial biases, they would almost certainly
still qualify as a defendant’s “peers” according to the Supreme Court’s
conceptualization of the term. 233
Moving to the second question, it seems equally far-fetched that only a
select type of individual would agree to participate in the exercises. One
might worry, for example, about age groups, since people from younger
generations tend to be more accepting of new technologies, 234 and are likely

This argument assumes that the individuals in question do not hold explicitly
racist beliefs. While it is possible that the virtual reality exercises could modulate
racist attitudes by reducing self-other distinctions, individuals with explicit racial
prejudice should have already been removed from the jury pool during voir dire.
226
Banaji et al., supra note 9, at 57–58.
227
See Amodio, supra note 26, at 679 (discussing the incredibly hardwired nature
of implicit racial biases and their inability to be completely unlearned).
228
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879) (“The very idea of a jury
is a body of men composed of the peers or equals of the person whose rights it is
selected or summoned to determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates,
persons having the same legal status in society as that which he holds”).
229
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975).
230
Id. at 538.
231
Banaji et al., supra note 9, at 58.
232
Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538.
233
Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308 (explaining the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the term “peer”).
234
Pew Res. Ctr., Millennials: Confident. Connected. Open to Change, 13, 26
(2010),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/10/millennials-confidentconnected-open-to-change.pdf [https://perma.cc/X59H-KVYB].
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more experienced with, or interested in, virtual reality in particular. 235 Yet,
virtual reality is becoming so commonplace that anyone with a New York
Times print subscription has likely heard of virtual reality and owns a Google
Cardboard headset. 236 But beyond the technological aspects of virtual
reality, individuals from older generations might simply feel a stronger
impetus to fulfill their civic duty and participate on a jury. 237 The bottom
line is that many factors will likely guide individuals’ acceptance of virtual
reality exercises and motivations to participate in the training. It therefore
seems reasonable to expect that a fair cross-section of the community would
indeed be represented.
2. Coercion
Among the list of potential concerns, coercion might present the most
pressing issue. As noted in the previous section, 238 coercion typically
involves three main aspects: (1) a reduced set of options, (2) an adverse
deprivation of something to which an individual is entitled, and (3)
manipulative intent by the agent creating the choice. 239 Compared to the
situation with judges, critics could make a more compelling case for viewing
a pseudo-compulsory system with jurors as coercive. However, the
following section contends that even if we decide the policy contains
coercive elements, the policy should not be considered problematic.
Starting with the first criterion, one could argue that since a potential
juror under the pseudo-compulsory scheme no longer has the option of
serving without participating in the training, an option has been taken away
from her. Yet, as with the case of judges, this Article suggests that a juror’s
set of available choices has not been reduced, but instead modulated with
additional conditions. In the existing system, if selected for the jury,
individuals essentially have two choices—serve or face consequences of
monetary fines or potential arrest. 240 With the proposed policy, jurors have a
Here’s How Gaming Will Fuel Rapid Growth in the Virtual Reality Market,
INSIDER
(Sept.
22,
2015,
5:00
PM),
BUSINESS
http://www.businessinsider.com/gaming-will-fuel-the-virtual-reality-market-2015-5
[https://perma.cc/3NAD-49UR].
236
Robertson, supra note 184.
237
See Associated Press, 5 Things About Americans’ Slipping Sense of Civic
Duty, N.Y. POST (Dec. 29, 2014, 2:14 PM), http://nypost.com/2014/12/29/5-thingsabout-americans-slipping-sense-of-civic-duty/
[https://perma.cc/A2HB-5VER]
(noting that younger generations feel less compelled by a sense of civic duty than
older generations).
238
See supra Section IV.C.2.
239
WERTHEIMER, supra note 207, at 202–21; Hawkins & Emanuel, supra note
207, at 17.
240
28 U.S.C. § 1866(g) (2012).
235
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more complicated set of options. A potential juror could choose to (a)
consent to the training and serve if selected; (b) consent to the training,
refuse to serve if selected, and subsequently face the same punitive
ramifications as in the existing system; (c) not provide consent to the
training, forfeit the opportunity to serve if selected, and fulfill some
alternative civic duty instead; or (d) not provide consent to the training,
forfeit the opportunity to serve, refuse to fulfill the alternative civic duty, and
face punitive consequences.
If we entertain the idea that an option set has been constrained, the
question of whether it has been constrained in an inherently detrimental way
depends on whether a juror has a right to serve.241 Although a few legal
provisions come close, there does not appear to be an explicit legal right to
jury service. All citizens have a right to “have the opportunity to be
considered for service;”242 yet, the right to be considered is not equivalent to
the right to actually serve, and the opportunity to be summoned (which this
provision seems to encapsulate)243 is different than the opportunity to be
selected. Next, while the Supreme Court has acknowledged a right to not be
excluded from service for reasons such as race,244 a positive right to serve has
never been officially pronounced.245 Moreover, the Supreme Court has
recognized states’ abilities to set “relevant qualifications” for juror
eligibility.246 The willingness to participate in virtual reality training could
plausibly be considered a relevant factor, since impartiality is a core tenet of
the jury system. Nevertheless, some scholars assert that a right to serve is
implicit in other rights, such as the right to vote, or First Amendment rights
protecting civic participation.247 Whether or not such arguments actually
establish a legal right to serve, they seem to imply a moral right or privilege
to serve. According to this line of thinking, citizens might be tacitly entitled
241

WERTHEIMER, supra note 207, at 202–21 (explaining that coercion entails
being deprived of something to which one is entitled).
242
28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012).
243
Id. (“It is further the policy of the United States that all citizens shall have the
opportunity to be considered for service on grand and petit juries in the district courts
of the United States, and shall have an obligation to serve as jurors when summoned
for that purpose”).
244
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402–11 (1991).
245
Interestingly, an American Bar Association paper cites Powers v. Ohio as
articulating a legal right of all citizens to serve on juries, despite the fact that the
actual opinion does not support such a claim. See ABA Comm’n on the Am. Jury
Project, ABA Principles for Juries and Jury Trial, 11 (2005),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/american_jury/fi
nal_commentary_july_1205.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/V73R-TM99].
246
Carter v. Jury Comm’n of Green Cty., 396 U.S. 320, 332–33 (1970).
247
AKHIL R. AMAR & ALAN R. HIRSCH, FOR THE PEOPLE: WHAT THE
CONSTITUTION REALLY SAYS ABOUT YOUR RIGHTS 61–63 (1999); FERGUSON, supra
note 214, at 12–21.
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to have the opportunity to serve as a function of their membership in
society—jury service allows citizens to contribute to the societal and legal
framework under which they operate on a daily basis, and upholds
fundamental Constitutional values that comprise a democratic nation. 248
The third prong of the coercion definition, manipulation, seems the most
difficult to contend. 249 The intent of a pseudo-compulsory policy is to
increase the fairness of the trial system, not to make jurors do something
against their will. However, given that jury service is mandatory if an
individual is selected, and that citizens might have a strong desire to
participate in the justice system, one could argue that the government, by
instituting a pseudo-compulsory policy, is exploiting the interests of jurors to
advance its own goals.
Even if we accept that the pseudo-compulsory policy contains coercive
elements (although this Article has posited multiple reasons to doubt such a
position), not all individuals would necessarily be coerced into agreeing to
the virtual reality training. For instance, some individuals might lack a
strong interest in serving. Given that many citizens attempt to get out of jury
service and view it as an unpleasant burden,250 the idea that some individuals
would uninhibitedly choose to waive a “moral right” to service seems
reasonable or even predictable. Additionally, other individuals might
actively desire to participate in the virtual reality exercises, and thus would
not be pressured into making the decision to do so. That being said, consent
might be undermined in individuals who harbor a strong interest in serving,
but possess qualms about the exercises. Yet, although coercion is a serious
issue, this particular case does not seem especially problematic. Jurors are
required to impartially hear the case before them. If an individual has a
substantial interest in engaging in the justice system through this civic duty,
then the policy would be furthering the interests of this individual—the
policy advances the goals that jury service entails, and allows jurors to better
meet their required duties. In other words, if the exercises work as expected,
it seems counterintuitive that a potential juror would have a strong interest in
serving but be averse to the training.
Accordingly, although freedom of thought, representativeness, and
coercion each deserve legitimate discussion, this Article suggests that none
of these objections actually undermine the proposal in question.
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D. Civic Duties and the Demands of the Role
Beyond arguing that virtual reality training with jurors would be
justifiable, this Article suggests that jurors should be expected to participate
in the training exercises. The system of trial by jury affords citizens a
remarkably important role in society. Individuals are asked to decide matters
that could completely change the course of another citizen’s life. While jury
duty is mandatory for those eligible, 251 it is also an opportunity for citizens to
partake in a democratic process, and promote the values and liberties central
to the Constitution. 252 But, if we are to champion the importance of the jury
and its role in preserving a democratic society, then we also have to
acknowledge that jury service is a duty that entails certain requirements. If
jurors are not impartial, they cannot adequately uphold the values of fairness
and the presumption of innocence that the justice system and democracy
demand. And so, even though jurors do not actively choose to contribute to
the justice system in the way that judges do, they should still be expected to
fulfill their roles to the best of their ability.
Importantly, the law already has a set of standards in place to prevent
those deemed incapable of fulfilling their duties from serving. 253 For
instance, individuals considered too young, with insufficient English
language fluency, with certain mental disabilities, or with obvious conflicts
of interest are all ineligible for service. 254 Moreover, during the trial period,
jurors are prohibited from speaking to each other at specific times about
certain topics, their freedom of movement may be restricted, and their access
to various sources of information may be limited. 255 These regulations
reflect an expectation that jurors not only perform their civic duty, but also
perform it well. If virtual reality training enables jurors to reduce implicit
racial biases and engage in more impartial decision-making, then it seems
quite reasonable to expect them to do so as a function of their role.
CONCLUSION
Our criminal justice system places substantial value on fairness and the
presumption of innocence. A plethora of rules and protections exist to
prevent the conviction of an innocent individual, even at the cost of
potentially acquitting a guilty perpetrator. 256 For example, the burden of
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proof is on the prosecution, 257 the threshold for a guilty verdict is beyond a
reasonable doubt, 258 defendants are guaranteed the right to a fair trial by an
impartial jury, 259 and Constitutional amendments emphasize due process
during trials. 260 While this framework is revered for promoting a transparent
and just system, the prevalence and impact of implicit racial biases in the
courtroom serve to undermine the realization of these values and standards.
If black defendants tend to be automatically associated with guilt,
criminality, and threat on a subconscious level, especially by those in
influential decision-making positions, it becomes impossible to truly achieve
the requirements of impartiality and the presumption of innocence.
In light of the persisting impact of implicit racial bias in the courtroom,
this Article has put forth an unconventional and novel approach in the search
for a solution. While much research remains to be conducted, virtual reality
exercises have the potential to reduce implicit racial biases more effectively
than measures proposed in existing literature. If virtual reality proves
sufficiently effective, this Article has suggested policies for implementation,
arguing that virtual reality training should become a justifiable expectation
among both judges and jurors. However, even if virtual reality mechanisms
do not live up to their potential, the discussion of virtual reality in the
courtroom is still a fruitful endeavor. If nothing else, such a proposition
should inspire further conversation about the use of innovative methods for
curbing implicit racial biases. Virtual reality training might not be the
ultimate answer, but it deserves serious consideration.

See Winship, 397 U.S. at 361–63 (discussing the “beyond a reasonable doubt”
standard).
258
Id.
259
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
260
U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV § 1.
257

